A non-local box is an abstract device into which Alice and Bob input bits x and y respectively and receive outputs a and b respectively, where a, b are uniformly distributed and a⊕b = x∧y. Such boxes have been central to the study of quantum or generalized non-locality, as well as the simulation of non-signaling distributions. In this paper, we start by studying how many non-local boxes Alice and Bob need in order to compute a Boolean function f . We provide tight upper and lower bounds in terms of the communication complexity of the function both in the deterministic and randomized case. We show that non-local box complexity has interesting applications to classical cryptography, in particular to secure function evaluation, and study the question posed by Beimel and Malkin [BM04] of how many Oblivious Transfer calls Alice and Bob need in order to securely compute a function f . We show that this question is related to the non-local box complexity of the function and conclude by greatly improving their bounds. Finally, another consequence of our results is that traceless two-outcome measurements on maximally entangled states can be simulated with 3 non-local boxes, while no finite bound was previously known.
There has been a lot of work trying to identify, in various settings, which functions can be easily evaluated in a secure way, i.e., without any invocation of the black box, and which are hard to evaluate securely, i.e., require at least one invocation of the black box ([CK91, Kus92, BMM99, Kil91, KKMO00, Kil00]). Moreover, Beaver [Bea96] showed that there exists a hierarchy of different degrees of hardness for the information-theoretic setting. In other words, for all k, there are functions that can be securely evaluated with k invocations of the AND box but cannot be computed with k − 1 uses of the black box.
Beimel and Malkin [BM04] proposed a quantitative approach to secure function evaluation by studying how many calls to an Oblivious Transfer or other complete black box one needs in order to securely compute a given function f in the honest-but-curious model. For a Boolean function f : X × Y → {0, 1} and deterministic protocols, they provide a combinatorial characterization of the minimal number of AND calls required, which however does not lead to an efficient algorithm to determine how many ANDs are actually required. They also show that 2 |X | ANDs are sufficient for any function. In the randomized case, they provide lower bounds depending on the truth-table of the function which can be at most of the order of n. They also state that "it would be very interesting to try and explore tighter connections with the communication complexity of the functions".
Finally, Naor and Nissim [NN01] have given some connections between the communication complexity of a function f and the communication complexity for securely computing f . These results, translated into the BeimelMalkin and our model, only show that the number of ANDs is at most exponential in the communication complexity.
Summary of results.
In this paper, we provide more evidence on the importance of non-local boxes by showing how they relate to different models of communication complexity as well as how they can be used as a tool to quantitatively study secure function evaluation.
First, we study how many non-local boxes are needed in order to distributively compute a Boolean function f . We define four different variants denoted N L, N L ε , N L || , N L || ε , where the first two are the deterministic and randomized non-local box complexity and the latter two are the deterministic and randomized complexity where the non-local boxes are only used in parallel. We provide lower and upper bounds for all these models in terms of communication models and show that in many cases our bounds are tight.
For the deterministic parallel non-local box complexity, we show that N L || (f ) is equal to the rank of the function f over GF 2 . This also implies that it is equivalent to the communication complexity of the function in the following model: Alice and Bob send to a referee one message each and the referee outputs the Inner Product of the two vectors mod 2. Moreover we show that N L || (f ) is always greater than the deterministic communication complexity D(f ) and less than 2 D(f ) . These bounds are optimal as can be seen by looking at the functions of Inner Product and Disjointness.
In the randomized parallel case, we define a notion of approximate rank over GF 2 which is equal to N L || ε (f ), under the assumption that the output of the protocol is the XOR of the outcomes of the non-local boxes. The notion of approximate rank over R has been used for communication complexity [Bd01] and gives upper and lower bounds in the randomized model.
For the deterministic non-local box complexity N L(f ), we show that it is at least the communication complexity D(f ) and, of course, smaller than N L || (f ), which is again a tight bound. In the randomized case, we prove that it is bounded above by the communication complexity R ||,MAJ (f ) in the following model: Alice and Bob send to a referee one message each and the referee outputs 1 if for the majority of indices, the two messages are equal. This is a natural model of communication complexity that has appeared repeatedly, for example in the simulation of quantum protocols by classical ones and in various upper bounds on simultaneous messages [KNR99, Gro97, SZ08, LS08] . This model is also bounded above in terms of γ ∞ 2 , a quantity which has been used for upper and lower bounds on communication complexity [LS08] .
In another application of our work, using the recent result of Regev and Toner [RT07] , we show that traceless two-outcome measurements on maximally entangled states can be simulated with 3 non-local boxes. Previously, no finite bound was known for this case. In order to do this we need to extend our results from Boolean functions to any distribution.
Then, we look at the consequences of our results in the area of secure function evaluation. The main question we study is how many calls to a secure primitive one needs to make in order to securely evaluate a function f . Specifically, in the honest-but-curious model, we exactly characterize the number of secure AND boxes we need in order to evaluate f by the one-way communication complexity of f . Our proof will be reminiscent of our proofs for the non-local box complexity. In the malicious model, we upper bound the number of Oblivious Transfer boxes needed by the non-local box complexity of f , when the non-local boxes are used in order. This implies strong upper bounds in terms of the communication complexity as well as γ ∞ 2 . For the lower bounds, we show that the communication complexity of f remains a lower bound for optimal protocols that securely evaluate f .
Our results show that non-local boxes, introduced for the study of quantum correlations or more general nonlocality, can provide a novel way of looking at questions about classical communication complexity, secure function evaluation and complexity theory.
Preliminaries

Communication Complexity
Let f : X × Y → {0, 1} be a bipartite Boolean function. Alice gets an input x ∈ X and Bob gets an input y ∈ Y. We say that Alice and Bob compute f (x, y) in parity if after executing a protocol, Alice outputs a bit a and Bob outputs a bit b such that a ⊕ b = f (x, y), where we use ⊕ to denote both the logical XOR and addition mod 2. This model differs from the standard model, where one of the players outputs the value of the function, by at most 1 bit.
We use the following notions of communication complexity. In probabilistic models, we assume that the players have a common source of randomness.
• D(f ) and R ε (f ): deterministic and ε-bounded error communication complexity of f (x, y) in parity.
• D → (f ) and R → ε (f ): one-way deterministic and bounded-error communication complexity of f (x, y) in parity.
• D (f ) and R ε (f ): deterministic and bounded-error communication complexities in the model of simultaneous messages, where Alice and Bob each send a message to the referee and the referee outputs the value of the function f (x, y).
For the model of simultaneous messages, we also consider some natural restrictions on how the referee computes the output from the messages he receives from the players. We assume the messages sent are of the same length. Suppose the referee receives bits a = (a 1 , . . . , a t ) from Alice, and b = (b 1 , . . . , b t ) from Bob. If the referee always computes a predefined function g(a, b), then we write D ,g (f ) or R ,g ε (f ) to be the length of the message sent by the players (not the sum of these lengths, as is done in the standard model). In this paper, we will consider two functions, the inner product modulo 2, IP 2 (a, b) = i (a i · b i ) (where · denotes the multiplication over GF 2 , which corresponds to the logical AN D) and the majority function, M AJ(a, b) = M AJ(a 1 ⊕ b 1 , . . . , a t ⊕ b t ).
Non-local box Complexity
Definition 1 (Non-local box). A non-local box is a device shared by two parties, which on one side takes Boolean input x and immediately produces Boolean output a, and on the other side takes Boolean input y and immediately produces Boolean output b, according to the following distribution:
Let us stress the importance of timing in this definition. Indeed, Alice should receive her output a from the box as soon as she has entered her input x, no matter if Bob has already entered his input or not (and vice-versa). This is possible because the input-output distribution is non-signaling, that is, the marginal distribution of Alice's input a does not depend on Bob's input y, since p(a|x, y) = 1/2 for any a, x, y. In other words, from Alice's point of view, a is just an unbiased random bit. The reason for this definition is to mimic an EPR experiment, where Alice obtains her measurement outcome as soon as she performs her measurement, independently of whether Bob has performed his measurement or not.
We study a model akin to communication complexity, where Alice and Bob use non-local boxes instead of communication. In a non-local box protocol, Alice and Bob wish to compute some function f : X × Y → {0, 1}. Alice gets an input x ∈ X , Bob gets an input y ∈ Y, and they have to compute f (x, y) in parity. Recall that it means that at the end of the protocol, Alice outputs a ∈ {0, 1} and Bob b ∈ {0, 1}, such that a ⊕ b = f (x, y). For a protocol P , we will write P (x, y) = (a, b). In the course of the protocol, Alice and Bob are allowed shared randomness and may use non-local boxes, but they may not communicate. Bob is not allowed to see Alice's inputs to the non-local boxes, nor does he see the outcome on Alice's side, and likewise for Alice.
Definition 2. For any function f : X ×Y → {0, 1}, N L(f ) is the smallest t such that there is a protocol that computes f in parity exactly, using t non-local boxes.
We will label the non-local boxes with labels from 1 to t. (Recall that in general, Alice and Bob are not required to use the t non-local boxes in the same order.) We relax the exactness condition and allow the protocol's outcome to be incorrect with constant probability ε.
Definition 3. For any function
is the smallest t such that there is a protocol P using t non-local boxes, with Pr[P (x, y) = (a, b) with a ⊕ b = f (x, y)] ≥ 1 − ε.
We will also study two variants of the general model, where the non-local boxes are used in a restricted manner. First, we assume that the non-local boxes are used in parallel, that is, the input to any non-local box does not depend on the outcome of any other. In this model, we denote the complexity N L || in the exact case, and N L || ε in the ε error case.
Second, we define the model where both players use the non-local boxes in the same order, that is, the non-local boxes are labeled from 1 to t and Alice's input to the non-local box with label i does not depend on the outputs from the non-local boxes labeled from i + 1 to t (similarly for Bob). Note that in the most general case, Alice and Bob may use their t non-local boxes with labels 1 through t in whichever order they want. For example, Alice may use the non-local box with label 3 first, then use the output in order to compute the input for the non-local box with label 1, while Bob might use the non-local box with label 1 first and so forth. The complexity in this model is denoted N L ord in the exact case, and N L ord ε in the ε error case. It is clear that this model is more powerful than the parallel model but less powerful than the general non-local box complexity. In fact, we will only use this last variant when we talk about secure function evaluation. Note also that in all these models, the non-local boxes are still non-signaling and Alice and Bob receive the outputs of the non-local boxes immediately after they enter their inputs.
Finally, we consider a restriction where the players always output the same predefined function g of the outputs of the non-local boxes. Let (a 1 , b 1 ) , . . . , (a t , b t ) be the outcomes of the t non-local boxes in some particular run of a protocol. 
Secure Function Evaluation
We will consider the following cryptographic primitives. While at first view, these definitions seem similar to the definition of the non-local box, note that the timing properties are different: for the cryptographic primitives, the outputs are produced only after all the inputs have been entered into the device. It is precisely this subtlety that has led to confusion when trying to use non-local boxes to implement cryptographic primitives, in particular for bit commitment, when timing is particularly important, since a cheating Alice could wait until the reveal phase before committing her bit into the non-local box, without Bob ever realizing it [BCU + 07]. However, we will see that this is not an issue for our results on secure computation. Let f : X × Y → {0, 1} be a bipartite Boolean function. We study the number of cryptographic primitives required to compute f . In all the models we consider, we require perfect privacy. In the honest-but-curious model, perfect privacy means that when a player follows the protocol, he should not learn more than required about the other player's input. In the malicious model, this condition must still hold even if the player does not follow the protocol. Not more than required means, for models where the function must be computed in parity, that the players should learn nothing about the other's input, while for models where one of the player should output the function, it means that this player should learn nothing more than what he can infer from his input and the value of the function, while the other player should learn nothing.
Definition 4 (Oblivious transfer
Let us note that AND may not be used as a primitive in the malicious model, so we will consider the OT primitive instead. Moreover, in this model, it is known that perfect privacy [DM99] cannot be achieved without randomness. Therefore, in this setting we do not consider the deterministic model. Our bounds in the randomized malicious model also hold for the weaker honest-but-curious model.
• AN D(f ): number of secure AND gates required to securely compute f (x, y) (not in parity) in the deterministic, honest-but-curious model. We note that we can allow free two-way communication without in fact changing the complexity [BM04] .
• OT ε (f ): number of 2-1 Oblivious Transfer calls required to compute f (x, y) in parity with perfect privacy and ε error over the players' private coins, assisted with (free) two-way communication, in the malicious model.
Complexity Measures
We will compare non-local box complexity to traditional models of communication complexity and prove upper and lower bounds for this new model. Some of these bounds are in terms of the factorization norms of the communication matrix [LS08] and related measures.
It is known that 2 log(γ 2 (M )) gives a lower bound on deterministic communication complexity of M , where M is a sign matrix of the Boolean function to be computed [LS08] . In order to lower bound the bounded error communication complexity in the randomized and quantum case, we consider a "smoothed" version of this measure. 
2 ) (implicit in [LS08] ), where α = 1 1−2ε . The discrepancy of a sign matrix M over inputs X ×Y with respect to distribution µ over the inputs is Disc µ (M ) = max R (x,y)∈R µ(x, y)M (x, y), where R is taken from all possible rectangles. It is known that γ
, and for any α, γ
Finally, for a Boolean function, the L 1 norm is defined as the sum of the absolute values of its Fourier coefficients. 
We can think of the 2n bits of input of the function as equally split between Alice and Bob. Grolmusz uses this notion to upper bound the randomized communication complexity by proving that
3 Deterministic non-local box complexity
Characterization of NL ||,⊕ in terms of rank
We start by studying a restricted model of non-local box complexity, where the non-local boxes are used in parallel and at the end of the protocol, Alice and Bob output the parity of the outputs of their non-local boxes respectively. We will show that the complexity of f in this model is equal to the rank of the communication matrix of f over GF 2 . It is known that this rank is equal to the minimum m, such that f (x, y) can be written as
This restricted variant of non-local box complexity is exactly the one that appears in van Dam's work [van05] , where he shows that any Boolean function f can be computed by such a protocol of complexity 2 n . Moreover, we prove that the restriction that the players output the XOR of the outcomes of the non-local boxes is without loss of generality.
Then we construct a protocol that uses t non-local boxes in parallel, where Alice and Bob output the parity of the outcomes of the non-local boxes and for every input (x, y) the output of the protocol is equal to f (x, y). The inputs of Alice and Bob to the i-th non-local box are the bits p i (x) and q i (y), i ∈ [t] respectively and let a i , b i the outputs of the non-local box such that a i ⊕ b i = p i (x) · q i (y). Alice and Bob output at the end of the protocol the value
Conversely, if there exists a protocol where Alice and Bob use t non-local boxes in parallel with inputs
From this last argument, we get
since the players can send p i and q i to the referee who computes the inner product. For the converse, if the referee receives m A , m B from each player and computes their inner product mod 2, the players can instead input each bit of the message into a non-local box and output the parity of the outputs to obtain the same result.
For the next corollary, we use the fact that log(2rank [KN97] ). (The plus one on the right side of the inequality appears because in our model where the value of the function is distributed among the players, the communication complexity can be one bit less than in the standard model.)
On the other hand, it is easy to see that the one-way communication complexity is a lower bound on the non-local box complexity.
Proof. For any deterministic non-local box protocol of complexity t, Alice can send her t inputs to the non-local boxes to Bob, and since the protocol is always correct, in particular it is correct if both players assume that the output of Alice's non-local boxes are 0, Alice can output using this assumption. Bob can then compute his outputs of the non-local boxes and complete the simulation of the protocol. This shows that the one-way communication complexity is at most t.
Notice that similarly to the traditional model, this implies an upper bound on the simultaneous messages model when computing in parity as well since for deterministic communication complexity
To see this, it suffices to see that Alice's message plus her output, together with Bob's message plus his output, determine a monochromatic rectangle in the communication matrix.
Removing the XOR restriction
In this section we show that both in the general and in the parallel model of deterministic non-local box complexity, we can assume without loss of generality that the players output the XOR of the outcomes of the non-local boxes.
Proof. Let P any protocol that uses t non-local boxes and at the end Alice outputs A(x, a) and Bob outputs B(y, b), where a = (a 1 , . . . , a t ) and b = (b 1 , . . . , b t ) are Alice and Bob's non-local box outputs. Instead of outputting these values they use another two non-local boxes with inputs
) the outputs of the non-local boxes. We have
Finally,
Unlike the general case, showing that in the parallel case we can assume that the players output the XOR of the outputs of the non-local boxes is not a trivial statement.
We proceed by providing two lemmas before proving our theorem.
Lemma 2. Let a, b the outcomes of a non-local box and F, G, H arbitrary Boolean coefficients that do not depend on
Proof. Denote by p, q the inputs to the non-local box. By setting a = 0 and a = 1, we have
We now fix some notation. Let f : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} and P a protocol that computes f with zero error and uses t non-local boxes in parallel. Let p i (x), q i (y) the inputs to the i-th non-local box and a i , b i the corresponding outputs. We also note a = (a 1 , . . . , a t ) and
B S (y) · b S the final outputs of Alice and Bob, where A S are polynomials in x, B S polynomials in y, a S = i∈S a i and b S = i∈S b i . Then, from the correctness of the protocol, we have
We show that, without loss of generality, we may assume that the inputs to the non-local boxes satisfy some linear independence condition.
Definition 4. A set of bipartite functions
for some C i ∈ {0, 1} and functions α(x), β(y), implies C i = 0 ∀i ∈ T and α(x) = β(y).
Lemma 3. Let P be a protocol for f using t non-local boxes in parallel. Then there exists another protocol whose output is always equal to the one of P , uses t ′ ≤ t non-local boxes in parallel and the inputs to the non-local boxes are such that the set {p
and Bob do not need to use the k-th non-local box when implementing protocol P , it suffices for Alice to set a k = α(x) ⊕ i∈[t]\{k} C i · a i and for Bob to set b k = β(y) ⊕ i∈[t]\{k} C i · b i , which implies a new protocol with t − 1 non-local boxes. By repeating this procedure, they can build a protocol using t ′ ≤ t non-local boxes and such that the whole set
|| (f ) = t and let P be a deterministic protocol for f , using t non-local boxes. Let
B S (y) · b S the outputs of Alice and Bob respectively, where the subsets S are non-empty. First, in order to simulate the two local terms A ∅ (x) and B ∅ (y), Alice and Bob can use two non-local boxes with inputs (A ∅ (x), 1) and (1, B ∅ (y)). For the rest of the proof, all the subsets we consider are non-empty. We proceed by proving two claims about the outputs of the protocol.
Claim 1. For all (x, y, a) and for all
Proof. We prove this claim by induction on the size of T . By definition, the protocol satisfies for all (x, y, a), f (x, y) = A(x, a) ⊕ B(y, b). By factorizing the k-th non-local box, we get the following expression for every (x, y, a):
We can now use Lemma 2, and have that
for all (x, y, a) and for all k ∈ [t]. Hence, the claim is true for any subset T with |T | = 1. Suppose for the induction that it is true for any set of size n ∈ [t − 1] and consider any T such that
Applying Lemma 2 in the previous equation proves the claim for any T ∪ {k} and hence any set of size n + 1, which concludes the proof of Claim 1.
Claim 2. For all (x, y) and for all T ⊆ [t], we have:
Proof. We prove this claim by downward induction on the size of T , starting with |T | = t, that is, T = [t]. We immediately obtain from Claim 1 that
As a consequence, these do not depend on x or y, and we may define
. Now let n ≥ 2 and suppose that for any set S of size equal or larger to n + 1, we have A S (x) = B S (y) = 0, and for any set S of size n, we have A S (x) = B S (y). From Claim 1, we obtain that for all sets T of size n − 1,
, and by linear independence, we conclude that C T ∪{k} = 0 and A T (x) = B T (y). Using the same argument for any T of size n − 1, we obtain that A S (x) = B S (y) = 0 for all S of size n, and A T (x) = B T (y) for all T of size n − 1, which concludes the proof of Claim 2.
This claim implies that the protocol P outputs the parity of two local terms plus the outcomes of the non-local boxes, and as a consequence N L ||,⊕ (f ) ≤ t + 2.
Optimality of our bounds
We show here that the bounds we proved in the previous section on the parallel and general non-local box complexity
are optimal by giving examples of functions that saturate them. The first function we consider is the Inner Product function, IP (x, y) = ⊕ i (x i ∧ y i ), with x, y ∈ {0, 1}
n . For this function we have that
The second function we consider is the Disjointness function, which is equal to DISJ(x, y) = ∨ i (x i ∧ y i ), with x, y ∈ {0, 1} n . It is well-known that for the communication matrix of the Disjointness function we have rank GF 2 (M DISJ ) = 2 n and hence N L ||,⊕ (DISJ) = 2 n . On the other hand, we have D(DISJ) = n and show that N L(DISJ) = O(n). We describe below a simple protocol for the Disjointness function that follows from [BBL + 06] and was pointed out to us by Troy Lee and Falk Unger. The Disjointness function also provides an example of an exponential separation between deterministic parallel and general non-local box complexity.
The terms (a k ∨ a ℓ ) and (b k ∨ b ℓ ) can be locally computed by Alice and Bob respectively and hence they only need to use two non-local boxes with inputs (¬a k , ¬b ℓ ) and (¬a ℓ , ¬b k ) to compute the remaining terms. By combining n such distributed OR computations they compute ∨ i (a i ⊕ b i ) and hence output the value of DISJ(x, y) after using 3n non-local boxes.
Randomized non-local box complexity
In this section, we consider protocols that use shared randomness and have success probability at least 2/3. We start by comparing the parallel non-local box complexity to communication complexity. Then we exactly characterize N L ||,⊕ ε in terms of the approximate rank (over GF 2 ) of the communication matrix.
Upper and lower bounds for
Proof. For the first inequality, Alice sends all her inputs to the non-local boxes to Bob. They use the shared randomness to simulate the output of Alice's non-local boxes, which Alice can use to compute her output, and Bob uses to compute his outputs to the non-local boxes, and compute his output. For the last inequality, let us fix a randomized communication protocol P for f using t bits of communication. We can write P as a distribution over deterministic protocols P r each using at most t bits of communication, and computing some Boolean function f r . By Corollary 1, N L ||,⊕ (f r ) ≤ 2 t . Taking the same distribution over the non-local box protocols for f r , we get N L
Note that in fact any N L ,g ǫ protocol can be simulated in the simultaneous messages communication model, so in fact
The approximate rank over the reals has been shown to be a useful complexity measure for communication complexity [Bd01] . For non-local box complexity, we now define the notion of approximate rank over GF 2 .
Definition 5. Let P t denote the convex hull of Boolean matrices with rank over GF 2 at most t. Then for a [0, 1]-valued 1 matrix A the approximate rank over GF 2 is defined by ε−rank GF 2 (A) = min{t :
The next proposition gives an alternative definition of the approximate rank for Boolean matrices. This definition enables us to relate the approximate rank to the non-local box complexity.
Proposition 2. ε−rank GF 2 (M f ) is the minimum t, such that there exists a set of Boolean matrices A 1 , . . . , A R , and a probability distribution over [R] with the following properties:
Proof. Suppose that ε−rank GF 2 (M f ) = t, and let A ∈ P t such that M f − A ∞ ≤ ε. Denote by A 1 , . . . (A i (x, y) ) | ≤ ε. Moreover, for any i, rank GF2 (A i ) ≤ t. This proves that the set A 1 , . . . , A d and µ have the desired properties. The proof goes conversely as well.
Theorem 5. For any Boolean function
Proof. Fix a randomized protocol for f that uses t non-local boxes in parallel and is correct with probability at least 1 − ε. Let r be the string they share in the beginning of the protocol that is drawn according to some probability distribution from a set R. Since Alice and Bob output the XOR of the outcomes of the non-local boxes, the final outcome of the protocol is independent of the inherent randomness of the non-local boxes, in other words they always compute some function g r (x, y). Let us the consider the matrices A r = M gr . We know that rank GF2 (A r
Conversely, suppose that ε−rank GF 2 (M f ) = t. Then fix a set of Boolean matrices A 1 , . . . , A R such that for every
Consider the following protocol for f : Alice and Bob pick at random r ∈ R and compute the function g r (x, y) = A r (x, y). As rank GF2 (A r ) ≤ t, computing g r requires at most t non-local boxes in parallel. It is straightforward to check that this protocol is correct with probability
In the randomized case, it is easy to get rid of the XOR restriction in general non-local box protocols, since the proof for the deterministic case still goes through. On the other hand, for the parallel case, this appears to be a surprisingly deep question, which remains open. The main obstacle appears to be related to the inherent randomness of the non-local boxes.
Next, we relate the general non-local box complexity to the following model of communication: Alice and Bob send to a referee one message each and the referee outputs 1 if for the majority of indices, the two messages are equal. We denote the communication complexity in this model by R ||,MAJ ǫ (f ). This is a natural model of communication complexity that has appeared repeatedly in the simulation of quantum protocols by classical ones, as well as various upper bounds on simultaneous messages [KNR99, Gro97, SZ08, LS08].
Proof. For the lower bound, Alice and Bob can use shared randomness to simulate the output of Alice's non-local boxes. Alice then computes her inputs to the non-local boxes, and sends them to Bob. From Alice's inputs and outputs to the non-local boxes, Bob may compute his inputs and outputs. The players may then compute their outputs to the protocol, which have the same probability distribution as the original protocol.
For the upper bound, fix a t-bit simultaneous protocol for f , where the referee receives two messages a and b of size t from Alice and Bob and outputs M AJ(a 1 ⊕ b 1 , . . . , a t ⊕ b t ). It is well-known, by using an addition circuit, that the majority of t bits can be computed by a circuit of size O(t) with AN D, N OT gates. Moreover, the distributed AN D of two bits can be computed using two non-local boxes [BBL + 06]. We conclude that the non-local box complexity of the distributed Majority is O(t) and hence the theorem follows.
Our theorem implies the following relation between non-local box complexity and factorization norms.
Corollary 2. 2 log(γ
2 ), where α = Proof. It follows from our theorem and the inequalities 2 log(γ
2 ) (also implicitly in [LS08] ).
It is known that γ
, and also that for any α, γ
. Hence, since discrepancy gives a lower bound on the quantum communication complexity with entanglement Q * ε (f ) [Kre95] , we get the following corollary.
Finally, we can relate the non-local box complexity of a function f , to the L 1 norm of the Fourier coefficients of f by using a result by Grolmusz. Grolmusz showed that for any Boolean function f , there exists a randomized public coin protocol that solves f with complexity O(L 2 1 (f )). This protocol can be easily transformed into a simultaneous messages protocol where the referee outputs the distributed majority of the message bits. Hence,
Let us make here a last remark about the proof of Theorem 6. We started from a Simultaneous Messages protocol where the referee outputs a Majority function and we constructed a non-local box protocol with complexity equal to the communication complexity. If we look at this protocol, we can see that Alice and Bob can use their non-local boxes in the same order. This will be useful when we relate non-local boxes to secure function evaluation.
Optimality of our bounds and an efficient parallel protocol for Disjointness
In the deterministic case, we showed that our bounds are tight and also that the parallel and the general non-local box complexity can be exponentially different. Is the same true for the randomized case?
In fact, the Disjointness and Inner Product functions almost saturate our bound in terms of γ Proof. The idea is to reduce the Disjointness problem to a problem of calculating an Inner Product, which we know how to do with n parallel non-local boxes. In order to solve the general Disjointness problem with high probability, Alice and Bob proceed as follows: they look at a shared random string r 1 , . . . , r n and consider the strings x ∧ r and y ∧ r as inputs. In other words, they pick a random subset of their input bits, by picking each index with probability 1/2. Then they perform an Inner Product calculation on their new inputs by using n non-local boxes in parallel. Let a ⊕ b = IP (x ∧ r, y ∧ r). It is easy to see that if DISJ(x, y) = 0, then IP (x ∧ r, y ∧ r) = 0 for all r. On the other hand, if DISJ(x, y) = 1, i.e., if the intersection is non-empty, then Prob r [IP (x ∧ r, y ∧ r) = 1] = 1/2, since for a random subset, the probability that the size of the intersection on this subset is odd is exactly the same as the probability that the intersection is even. Hence, we have a one-sided error algorithm for Disjointness that is always correct when DISJ(x, y) = 0 and is correct with probability 1/2 when DISJ(x, y) = 1.
We can get a two-sided error algorithm in the following way: Alice and Bob simulate the protocol above until they obtain the outputs a, b. Then, using their shared randomness, they output a ⊕ b with probability 1 − p, and 0 ⊕ 1 or 1 ⊕ 0 with probability p/2. It is easy to see that when DISJ(x, y) = 0 then the success probability is 1 − p and when DISJ(x, y) = 1 the success probability is p + (1 − p)/2 = (1 + p)/2. Taking p = 1/3 makes the overall success probability of our algorithm 2/3.
Non-local boxes and measurement simulation
The question of the nature of non-local distributions arising from measurements of bipartite quantum states dates back to Maudlin [Mau92] , who used communication complexity to quantify non-locality. Perhaps a more natural question is how many non-local boxes are required to simulate quantum distributions, since non-local boxes maintain the nonsignaling property of these distributions. For binary measurements on maximally entangled qubit pairs it is known that 1 use of a non-local box suffices [CGMP05] .
In this section we present another application of our results on non-local boxes. Using the recent breakthrough of Regev and Toner [RT07] , who give a two-bit one-way protocol for simulating two-outcome measurements on entangled states for arbitrary dimensions, we show that this can be done with 3 non-local boxes. Previously, no finite upper bound was known for this problem.
Let p be a distribution over measurement outcomes A×B, conditioned on measurements X ×Y. For measurements on quantum states, the distribution is non-signaling, that is, the marginal distributions do not depend on the other player's measurement:
Therefore we write the marginals p(a|x) and p(b|y). In this paper we focus on distributions with uniform marginals over A = B = {0, 1}. These distributions are in bijection with [0, 1]-valued matrices. It is not hard to prove that the set of [0, 1]-valued matrices is the convex hull of the set of Boolean matrices. This implies that the corresponding non-signaling distributions can be written as convex combinations of distributions of the following form. For any f : X × Y → {0, 1}, we define the associated distribution
Definition 6 (Correlation matrix). Let p be a distribution with uniform marginals over
In other words, the correlation matrix C p f (x, y) is Boolean and coincides with the communication matrix M f . Observe that any protocol for f simulates the distribution p f , since we may assume without loss of generality that the outcomes are uniformly distributed (otherwise, Alice and Bob can flip their outcomes according to a shared random bit).
Just as for functions, we can define the communication and non-local box complexities of a distribution p. When error ǫ is allowed, we require that the distribution p ′ simulated by the protocol be such that C p − C p ′ ∞ ≤ ǫ. Since binary distributions with uniform marginals may be represented as convex combinations of distributions arising from functions, we can generalize some results of the previous section to this case:
Theorem 7. For any distribution p with uniform marginals over
Proof. For the first inequality, the non-local boxes are simulated by one-way communication the same way as they were for functions: the players use shared randomness to simulate Alice's output to the non-local boxes, then Alice computes her inputs to the non-local boxes according to those outputs, and sends them to Bob (see proof of Theorem 6 for details). Let t = R ǫ (p), and consider the corresponding randomized communication protocol. Let the shared randomness take value r with probability p r . For any possible value r, the protocol will compute a Boolean function f r such that D(f r ) ≤ t, and
Executing the non-local box protocol for f r with probability p r , we obtain a non-local box protocol simulating p with error at most ǫ, so that
Let t = ε−rank GF 2 (C p ). By definition, there exist Boolean matrices A r and a probability distribution p r such that rank GF2 (A r ) ≤ t and C p − r p r A r ∞ ≤ ǫ. Let f r be the Boolean function described by communication matrix A r . Theorem 1 implies that N L ||,⊕ (f r ) ≤ t. Executing the non-local box protocol for f r with probability p r , we obtain a non-local box protocol simulating p with error at most ǫ, so that N L ||,⊕ ε (p) ≤ t. The proof goes conversely as well.
The upper bound on the non-local box complexity in terms of the communication complexity may be slightly improved. While this is an insignificant improvement for most applications involving Boolean functions, this becomes relevant when considering low communication complexity distributions, as is the case for some quantum distributions.
Theorem 8. For any distribution p with uniform marginals over
Proof. We build on an idea presented in [DLR07] In the two-way communication case, the proof is more involved. We proceed recursively, at each step removing the last bit of communication. We handle the different communication scenarios by doubling the number of protocols at each step. Throughout this proof, T (k) will be a k-bit transcript, and A Therefore, when d k (T (k−1) ) = 1 we may write f (x, y) as
For 0 ≤ i ≤ 2 t−k − 1, we define the following output functions,
, and similar expressions, with A and B swapped, when d k (T (k−1) ) = 0. Thus, we may write
The simpler proof in the case of one-way protocol can be used to derive an explicit protocol using 3 non-local boxes to simulate the correlations arising from 2-outcome measurements made on an entangled bipartite state. By Tsirelson's theorem [Tsi85] , the problem of simulating these correlations reduces to the following problem.
• Alice receives a unit vector x ∈ R n • Bob receives a unit vector y ∈ R n • Alice outputs A ∈ {−1, 1} , Bob outputs B ∈ {−1, 1} such that the correlation equals the inner product of the two vectors: E[AB] = x · y.
Corollary 9. There is a protocol for simulating traceless two-outcome measurements on maximally entangled states, using 3 non-local boxes in parallel.
Proof. We sketch the protocol of Regev and Toner. Assume that the inputs to the problem are two unit vectors x, y ∈ R n . Alice and Bob share a random dimension 3 subspace of R n . Let G be the matrix of the projection onto this subspace. Alice and Bob start by applying a transformation x ′ = C( x), y ′ = C( y) (see [RT07] for details of this transformation C), then project their vectors on the random subspace, x ′′ = G x ′ , y ′′ = G y ′ . Let sgn : R → {−1, 1} be the sign function, that is, sgn(x) = 1 if x ≥ 0 and sgn(x) = −1 otherwise. Alice lets α i = sgn(x ′′ i ) for i = 0, 1, 2 and lets c i = α 0 · α i for i = 1, 2. Alice outputs A = α 0 and sends (c 1 , c 2 ) to Bob. Bob outputs B = sgn( y ′′ · z c1,c2 ), where z c1,c2 = (1, c 1 , c 2 ) .
In the protocol with 3 non-local boxes, labeled (1, −1), (−1, 1), (−1, −1), Alice inputs 1 into the box labeled (c 1 , c 2 ) if (c 1 , c 2 ) = (1, 1), and 0 into the other boxes. Bob inputs (1 − sgn( y ′′ · z m1,m2 ) · (sgn( y ′′ · z 1,1 )))/2 into the box labeled (m 1 , m 2 ). Let the outputs of the non-local box labeled m be (a m , b m ). Then Alice outputs A = α 0 · (−1) m am and Bob outputs B = sgn( y ′′ · z 1,1 ) · (−1) m bm .
Secure Function Evaluation
Honest-but-curious model
In the honest-but-curious model, it is well known that OT and AND are equivalent (up to a factor of 2).
Claim 3. One AND may be simulated by one OT. One OT may be simulated by two ANDs. These simulations preserve security in the honest-but-curious model.
As a starting point, we consider the most basic model, namely deterministic secure computation with ANDs in the honest-but-curious model. Beimel and Malkin [BM04] have shown that AN D(f ) ≤ 2 |X | . We show that it is characterized by the one-way communication complexity of f .
. Let P be a one-way communication protocol for f using t = D → (f ) bits of communication, where, on input x, Alice sends a message m(x) ∈ {0, 1} t to Bob and outputs A(x), while, on input y, Bob outputs B(y, m(x)). We now a build a secure protocol for f using 2 t secure ANDs. We label the AND gates by a t-bit string i. Let m = m(x). For the AND gate labeled i, Alice inputs 1 iff m = i, while Bob inputs B(y, i). Let a i be the outputs of the AND gates (received by Alice). Note that a m = B(y, m), and a i = 0 for all i = m. It then suffices for Alice to output A(x) ⊕ a m . The correctness of the protocol is immediate. The privacy for Alice is trivial since Bob does not receive the output of the ANDs, and as a consequence no information from Alice. The privacy for Bob follows from the fact that the only possibly non-zero output that Alice receives from the ANDs is a m = B(y, m), which she can deduce from f (x, y) and her input x.
[
. Let P be a secure protocol for f using t = AN D(f ) AND gates. Beimel and Malkin showed that in the deterministic case, we can assume without loss of generality that there is no communication between Alice and Bob. In the protocol P , Alice and Bob input p i and q i , respectively, in the AND gate labeled i ∈ [t], and Alice receives the output a i = p i · q i . Since Bob does not receive any information, his inputs to the AND gates only depend on his input y, that is, q i = q i (y). We show that the same holds for Alice.
Let a = (a 1 , · · · , a t ) be the vector of outputs from the AND gates. For fixed x, since the protocol is deterministic, and Alice should only learn whether f (x, y) is 0 or 1, she should only receive two possible vectors, say a 0 (x) when f (x, y) = 0 and a 1 (x) otherwise. Note that if there exists some x 0 ∈ X such that f (x 0 , y) is constant for all y ∈ Y, say f (x 0 , y) = 0, Alice only receives one possible vector a 0 (x 0 ) when x = x 0 . In that case, we can fix a 1 (x 0 ) arbitrarily to any vector different from a 0 (x 0 ). Let m = m(x) be the first index such that a , so it has to be the case that p m (x) = 1 (otherwise a m is always 0). From the output of that gate, Alice already knows the value f (x, y) (depending on whether the output is a 0 m (x) or a 1 m (x)), so she does not need the outputs of the last t − m(x) AND gates, and we can assume without loss of generality that she just inputs p i (x) = 0 for all i > m(x).
To summarize, we can always assume that Alice inputs p i (x) = 0 in all AND gates, except for some index i = m(x) where she inputs 1. For this AND gate, the output will therefore coincide with Bob's input q m (y). One can say that this shows that for most functions, randomization is necessary in order to construct efficient protocols even in the honest-but-curious model.
Malicious model
As we said, the AND primitive cannot be used in the malicious model: indeed, a dishonest Alice may input 1 in all ANDs, and she obtains Bob's input for free, which still allows her to compute the AND. Therefore, for a dishonest Alice, each AND is just equivalent to a bit of communication (Bob sends his input to Alice), and this does not allow for unconditional secure computation. For this reason, in the malicious model we consider the OT primitive. Moreover, it is known that in the malicious model, deterministic secure computation is impossible [DM99] , so we consider the case where Alice and Bob may use private coins and the protocol can have ε error.
Due to their non-signaling property, protocols using non-local boxes only and no communication, such as those presented in the previous sections, are trivially secure even against malicious players. Indeed, the non-signaling property implies that the view of the protocol by a possibly dishonest player is always independent from the actions of the other player. We show that certain such protocols may be transformed into protocols using OTs, namely the protocols where Alice and Bob use their non-local boxes in the same order. At this point, we don't know if this type of protocols are strictly weaker than general non-local box protocols. Nevertheless, our upper bounds in terms of communication complexity hold for such protocols as well (Corollary 5) and hence they translate into upper bounds on OT ε (f ).
Theorem 11. For any
Proof. Let us consider a protocol for f using t non-local boxes in order and no communication. Let us denote (p 1 , . . . , p t ) and (a 1 , . . . , a t ) the inputs and outputs of Alice's non-local boxes and (q 1 , . . . , q t ) and (b 1 , . . . , b t ) the inputs and outputs of Bob's non-local boxes. The fact that they use these non-local boxes in order implies that p i (and q i ) can only depend on the inputs and outputs of the first (i − 1) non-local boxes but not on the remaining ones. Note that still Alice and Bob get their outputs immediately when they enter their inputs.
We now replace each non-local box with an OT starting from the first one, keeping the distribution of the view of the protocol exactly the same. Alice and Bob know how to pick the inputs to the first non-local box p 1 , q 1 since they only depend on their inputs (x, y) and the randomness. To replace this non-local box, Alice picks a random bit r 1 and inputs {r 1 , r 1 ⊕ p 1 } to the OT box; Bob inputs q 1 and hence, his output becomes r 1 ⊕ p 1 · q 1 . Finally, Alice and Bob set the outputs of the simulated non-local box to a 1 = r 1 and b 1 = r 1 ⊕ p 1 · q 1 . The simulation of the distribution of the outputs of the non-local box is perfect, since a 1 , b 1 are unbiased random bits and a 1 ⊕ b 1 = p 1 · q 1 .
Alice and Bob continue with the simulation of the remaining non-local boxes until the end (Alice using a fresh private random bit for each NLB). Note that for each non-local box, Alice and Bob can compute the inputs p i , q i from exactly the correct distribution, since they only depend on the previous (i − 1) non-local boxes which have been perfectly simulated. Hence, at the end, we obtain a protocol for f with the same success probability as the original one. Note that this construction works only when the non-local boxes are used in order.
It remains to prove that the new protocol with Oblivious Transfer boxes that we constructed is still secure. Privacy for Bob is immediate since he only interacts with Alice through the OTs (there is no additional communication), and Alice obtains no output from the OTs. Privacy for Alice follows from the fact that the only information that Bob receives from Alice during the protocol is the outputs of the OTs, and that these output bits are independent from each other and from Alice's input (since Alice uses independent private random bits to generate her OT inputs).
From the above theorem we can conclude that all the upper bounds that we had for the N L ord ε complexity (see Corollaries 2-5) translate into upper bounds for OT ε (f ).
The construction used to replace a NLB by a OT is due to Wolf and Wullschleger [WW05] . In this reference, this construction is used to prove that OT is equivalent to NLB, but note that this is strictly speaking incorrect due to the different timing properties of OT and NLB, as pointed out in [BCU + 07]. We now turn our attention to lower bounds, and for this we need to restrict ourselves to what we call 'optimal' secure protocols. An 'optimal' secure protocol is one where the function is computed securely in the usual sense, but we also require that for all the OT calls, there is always an input that remains perfectly secure throughout the protocol. Intuitively, since we try to minimize the number of OTs that we use, it should be the case that these OT calls are really necessary, in the sense that one of the two inputs should always remain secure. If for example both inputs are revealed at some point during the protocol, then one may not use this OT at all, resulting into a more efficient protocol. Even though intuitively our definition seems natural, at this point, we do not know whether this assumption can be done without loss of generality.
Formally, we define optimal secure protocols as follows. Let us fix some notation. Consider a protocol for the secure computation of a function f , using communication and OT boxes. A denotes the messages from Alice to Bob; B Bob's messages, S and T Alice and Bob's inputs to the OT boxes and O the outputs of the OT boxes. Note that only Bob receives these outputs. We assume that at every round i of the protocol, A i is Alice's message, B i is Bob's message and 
where r is the shared random string used in the protocol.
Let us see exactly what our definition says and how it is related to our intuitive definition of 'optimal' protocols. Let us consider the first condition (a similar discussion holds for the second condition, by swapping Alice and Bob's roles). We claim that the distribution of A i conditioned on (
Imagine that it is not the case. Then there exist two different strings (
′ . This is a contradiction to some strong notion of privacy. Bob, knowing (A [i−1] , B [i−1] , r) and receiving A i , will get some information about whether Alice's inputs are (
′ . This means that first, if these two strings differ in x, then Bob learns information about the input, which cannot happen; and second, if they differ in one of Alice's inputs to some OT box, then the malicious Bob could get information about both Alice's inputs. A malicious Bob can do this by for example picking an OT call at random and input a random bit into the OT box. With non-zero probability, this would be exactly the box for which he can get information about one input bit and with half probability this bit will be different than the one he learned from the OT box. Hence, we believe that our definition captures exactly the notion of an 'optimal' protocol where the inputs x, y as well as the inputs to the OT boxes must remain secure throughout the protocol.
Theorem 12. For any Boolean function
Proof. We want to show that even in the randomized case, communication doesn't help a lot. In other words, we want to show that O(t) bits of communication are sufficient, where t is the number of OT boxes the players use. Recall that we assume that the protocol is optimal in the following sense: privacy is preserved if both the inputs of the players and one of the inputs to the Oblivious Transfer boxes remain secure throughout the protocol. We start with a perfectly secure protocol that uses t OT boxes where Bob receives the outputs, and arbitrary two-way communication between Alice and Bob. We show how to obtain a protocol using O(t) bits of communication (and no OT boxes) by proceeding in four steps.
boxes. After this, we end up with a perfectly secure protocol using t OT boxes where Alice receives the outputs, t bits of communication from Alice to Bob, and no communication from Bob to Alice.
4. Finally, Alice and Bob can simulate these t OT boxes by communicating 2t bits and hence we end up with a communication protocol of complexity 3t. This concludes the proof of the theorem.
We now show how to perform the first step of the proof. The goal is to have Alice and Bob use their shared randomness in order to pick Alice's messages without her sending any bit. On the other hand, Bob is going to send the same messages to Alice as before and they will also use the same OT boxes. Bob can fix his private randomness in the beginning of the protocol. Alice is going to start with a uniform distribution on her private randomness and during the protocol she will update this distribution in order to remain consistent with the protocol up to that point.
We now describe the original protocol in more detail:
• Alice and Bob pick their private randomness r A and r B uniformly at random.
• We now give a new protocol where Alice and Bob use their shared randomness to simulate Alice's messages. The distribution remains exactly the same as in the original protocol. In order for this to hold, Alice needs to "update" her private randomness to retain consistency. Here is the new protocol:
• Alice and Bob pick their private randomness r A and r B uniformly at random. , r], i.e. they pick a next message from all messages that are consistent in the original protocol with the shared randomness r and the transcript so far, averaged over the private randomness r A for Alice. The key point is that due to the optimality condition in Definition 6, Bob also knows the distribution of Alice's message A i when averaged over r A , since it does not depend on (S [i] , x).
-Bob computes his message B i as the same function of (A arising from binary measurements on bipartite entangled states using 3 non-local boxes. Note that combining these last two results also implies that such quantum correlations may also be simulated using 3 OT boxes. The advantage is that, while non-local boxes may not be actually realized (due to their violation of Tsirelson's bound), OT boxes may be implemented under computational assumptions. Note that such a simulation with OT boxes breaks the timing properties of the EPR experiment, but this is unavoidable when simulating quantum correlations using classical resources, due to the violation of Bell inequalities. Moreover, contrary to a simulation with communication such as in [RT07] , using OT boxes preserves the cryptographic properties of the experiment, that is, Alice does not learn anything about Bob's measurement (and vice versa). During our investigations, we have come across a series of interesting open questions.
• For randomized non-local box complexity in parallel, can we remove the XOR restriction, that is, is the case that N L
The proof for the deterministic does not carry over because of the inherent randomness of the non-local boxes, which could be used to save on the number of non-local boxes when some error probability is authorized.
• While the Disjointness function provides an example of exponential gap between parallel and general deterministic non-local box complexity, the gap disappears in the randomized model. Is it always the case that parallel and general randomized non-local box complexities are polynomially related?
• In general, non-local boxes could be used in a different order on Alice and Bob's side. Does this provide any advantage, that is, are there functions for which N L ε (f ) < N L ord ε (f )? • As for secure function evaluation, we proved that the communication complexity is a lower bound on OT complexity only under some optimality assumption. Can this assumption be made without loss of generality?
• Finally, another interesting question is whether we can prove an analogue of Theorem 12 for non-local boxes. Ideally, we would like to prove that for secure computation with ordered non-local boxes, communication does not help. Indeed, due to the reduction from ordered non-local box protocols to OT protocols and vice versa, this would imply that N L ord ε (f ) is exactly OT ε (f ), and not just an upper bound. This would of course provide even more motivation to study non-local box complexity in the context of secure function evaluation. Note that working with non-local boxes instead of OT boxes provides a few advantages. First, protocols using non-local boxes (and no communication) are necessarily secure, even in the malicious model. Second, contrary to OT protocols, such non-local box protocols do not require private randomness (except the inherent randomness of the non-local boxes) to ensure security in this model.
